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The use of mobile devices and social media applications in organized
crime is increasingly increasing. Facebook Messenger is the most popular
social media applications used globally. Unprecedented time is spent by many
interacting globally with known and unknown individuals using Facebook.
During their interaction, personal information is uploaded. Thus, crafting a
myriad of privacy trepidation to users. While there are researches performed
on the forensic artifacts’ extraction from Facebook, no research is conducted
on setting Facebook Messenger applications as a default messaging applica-
tion on Android. Two Android mobile devices were used for data generation
and Facebook Messenger account was created. Disc imaging and data par-
tition were examined and accessed to identify changes in the orca database
of the application package using DB browser. The data were then gener-
ated using unique words which were used for conducting key searches. The
research discovered that mqtt_log_event0.txt of the Com.Facebook.orca/Cache
directory stores chat when messenger is set as a default messaging app.
The research finding shows that chats are recorded under messages tab
together with SMS of data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db
and data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/threads_db. This indicates that
only smstakeover_db stores SMS messaging information when using mes-
senger application. It is observed that once the user deletes a sent SMS
message, the phone number and the deleted time stamp remained in
the data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db database in the
address_table are recoverable. The results suggest that anonymization of data is
essential if Facebook chats are to be shared for further research into socialmedia
content.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Without any iota of doubt, smartphones have resulted in a variety of free or low-cost social media and instant messaging
applications. Due to the convenience, broad reach, affordability, and anonymity status attached some of these platforms;
many criminals tend to utilize them to pursue their activities since they find them as most “secure”. Indeed, many gov-
ernment security agencies across the world have blamed them for facilitating criminal activities. For example, in Europe,
it has been blamed as a platform that facilitates terrorist propaganda, hate speech, child sexual exploitation, copyright
breaches, and financial scams.1 One significant criminal activity affecting national security in many countries across the
world is terrorism which is influenced by instant messaging applications. Instant messaging software such as Fetion,
Skype Messenger, Facebook Instant Messenger, Yahoo Messenger, eBuddy, and WhatsApp Instant Messaging are the
most popular and commonly used IM applications.38,39 A research paper authored by Avis2 indicated that criminals and
violent extremists could use social media applications as a platform for; information exchange, carrying out recruitment
and training, planning attacks, conducting fundraising, and spreading of terrorist’s propaganda in developing countries.
Kenya being a developing country has indeed experienced some occurrences where terrorists have orchestrated their
activities through social media applications. For example, during the year 2013Westgatemall attack, Alshabaab terrorists
used the Twitter application to post real-time tweets as they executed the attack.3
A report published byCitizen SupportMechanism (CSM) an initiative of National Counter TerrorismCentre inKenya,
which is authored by Ekumbo and Angira,4 indicated that terrorists have continued to use social media applications
to pursue their interests in Kenya and other countries including but not limited to recruitment and training personnel.
According to the report, once the recruits have been identified and radicalized, they are encouraged to use encrypted
messaging platforms for communication since they provide anonymity and also not easily tracked by security agents. The
recruits are advised to shun themainstream communicationmedia such as the use ofmobile networks at all cost since it is
prone to interception. For instance, according to the report, investigations of three terror suspects whowere arrestedwhile
on their way to join Alshabaab terror group operating in Somali revealed that they had been radicalized and recruited
through Whatsapp as suicide bombers and jihadists. Following these findings, it can be suggested that the investigation
of social media applications and particularly instant messenger applications is crucial for digital forensic investigators in
Kenya. This research provides an overview of investigating Facebook Messenger application on the Android operating
system.
Statistics on social media indicate that Facebook is the most popular social network worldwide controlling 85.14%
of world social media users. Facebook also leads in UK and Kenya where it controls 81.71% and 85.43 of total mobile
social media users correspondingly. The study of Martin Brinkmann in5 wrote that Facebook would soon be phasing out
Facebook mobile website (m.facebook.com) which allows Facebook users to use chat functionality in favor of Facebook
Messenger application. The research of Jung et al6 also noted that Facebook was disabling the mobile website messaging
functionality to push people to use Facebook Messenger. Indeed today users cannot use Facebook mobile website to
message unless they have installed Facebookmessenger or are otherwise willing to switch to the Desktop viewwhichmay
be slow onmobile devices. This implies that in a near future Facebookmessenger could be one of themost popularmobile
instant messaging applications. It could also be suggested that criminals could also exploit it as a communication avenue.
A number of new features that were introduced in the Facebook messenger application in the year 2016. These features
included SMS integration, Switch account, contacts syncing, and secret conversations. Existing literature on Facebook
Messenger Artifacts indicated that Investigations have been done on forensic artifacts that can be recovered from the
Facebook messenger. However, these investigations have not addressed the artifacts generated by setting the application
as default SMS application on an android smartphones which are the most popular in the world. After considering these
research gaps, the aim of this research is to determine if there are recoverable forensic artifacts generated by setting
Facebook Messenger as a default SMS application on an Android 6.0.1 Marshmallow running on Samsung S5 device.
1.1 Digital forensics
It is no doubt that the world is experiencing significant technological innovation and advancement particularly in the
development of computing and digital devices. The tremendous growth in the usage of digital devices has led to the emer-
gence of an exponentially growing branch of forensic science called digital forensics. The study of Raghav and Saxena7
define digital forensics as a branch of forensic science that focuses on recovery and investigation of raw data residing in
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electronic or digital devices. Arguably, this can be considered as a shallowdefinition as the definitionmisses the significant
aspects of Digital forensics such as preservation, presentation, and repeatability. Digital forensics is broad and more than
just recovery and investigation. Also, the research published by Palmer8 of Digital Forensics ResearchWorkshop (DFRW)
defined Digital forensics as; “The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, collection,
validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital evidence derived from dig-
ital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to
anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to planned operation”. Palmer definition can be considered as the
most definitive as it includes all the aspects of digital forensics. Digital Forensics is about the application of repeatable
forensically sound scientific methods. The underlined principle is that the original evidence must be preserved.
Significantly, Pollitt9 points out that digital forensics has grown over the years along with the fast development of
computers and variety of other digital devices. As a result, digital forensics has progressed to create other branches based
on the kind of digital device being investigated. For example, there are branches like computer forensics where com-
puters are involved, network forensics where network evidence is required and mobile forensics where mobile phones
are being forensically examined and many other areas of specialities. According to Kamvar and Baluja and Thulin and
Velhelmson,10,11 these specialities are widely applied in the investigation of digital crime incidents. Pointedly, the author
notes that mobile phones are often considered to be more private than a computer; therefore, they are very vital in foren-
sic investigations. What is more, as they are frequently encountered in most criminal cases, mobile forensics comes as a
fundamental field of digital forensics.
Mobile forensics can be defined as a branch of digital forensics using a set of scientific methodologies in extracting,
analyzing, and presenting digital evidence from mobile devices in a legal context12 while the forensically sound proce-
dure is widely used to show the validity of the evidence in digital forensics community, this may not always be easy in
mobile forensics. According to National Cybersecurity University,13 this is because some mobile forensic tools require a
communication vector with the mobile phone hence a standard write blocking during extraction is not possible. What
is more, other mobile extraction methods may involve installing a bootloader or removing the chip from the mobile
phone before the extraction process. Nonetheless, in instances where extraction is not possible without altering the set-
tings of the mobile phone, proper procedures must be followed and the method used and changes observed must be
tested, validated, and adequately documented for evidence to be admissible in court(ibid). According to Lohrmann,14 the
ever-evolving mobile phone industry has resulted in the development of smartphones that are as powerful as personal
computers. The author argues that in near future smartphones will probably replace computers. Indeed, in the modern
world, smartphones have become repositories of sensitive data as they are being used to perform a variety of tasks such as
calling, messaging, and geolocation, emailing, and banking transactions amongmany other tasks. Variety of artifacts can
be recovered from mobile phones including SMS, Call history, Web browser history, MMS, multimedia files, documents,
deleted data, address book, E-Mail, GPS locations, calendar, and social networking applications data.15
Facebook Messenger is an instant messaging application that allows users to share messages, videos, photos, loca-
tion, create group chats, play games, and sendmoney using debit card details.16 The study of17 also noted additional more
features including feature to play games among the users. Facebook Messenger was initially developed as Facebook chat
extension to the Facebook application website in the year 2008. In the year 2011, Facebook chat was revamped to a stan-
dalone application for android and IOS devices called Facebook Messenger.18 Facebook Messenger has become second
most popular third-party mobile messaging application, which is widely used to share text messages, videos, locations,
photos, audios, and also in making VOIP calls between different users.19 Variety of user information valuable to foren-
sic investigators can be retrieved from the application using different examination techniques and tools. These artifacts
could range from locations, debit card details, phone numbers, photos, time stamps, and sender and recipient details.
1.2 Mobile forensics processes
The research of Raghav and Saxena7 notes that mobile phones have become dynamic systems that pose numerous chal-
lenges to digital forensic examiners. Furthermore, he points out that the rapid increase of variety of mobile phones from
different manufacturers has made it challenging for the digital forensic community to develop a single process or a tool to
examine all mobile phones as each investigation is distinct. Even so, William18 has presented a general mobile forensics
approach that is broken down into five phases as shown in Figure 1.
The study of William18 mentions that this phase begins after the examination request is made and it involves prepa-
ration of paperwork and forms required for: chain of custody documentation, device owner information, device model,
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F IGURE 1 Phases in mobile forensics18
device IMEI number, carrier and the associated number, nature of the incident the device was involved in, examination
request details and so on. The study of Murphy et al20 also identifies other critical elements and considerations related
to the mobile phone examination in this phase such as removable and external storage devices as well as other poten-
tial sources of evidence like biological evidence and fingerprints.7 Highlight that preparation phases can also involve
research on the mobile phone based on its model, operating system, version, and identification of suitable procedures
and tools to be used.
The research of Cynthia and Murphy20 describes this phase as a critical phase that requires careful steps in ensuring
evidence preservation. The study of Dogan and Akbal21 notes two challenges that forensic examiners face while seizing
mobile phone for examination. First, he noted that investigators face the challenge of the potential risk of evidence mod-
ification as mobile phones are networked devices. According to the author, mobile phones can communicate through
Bluetooth, WFI, and Telecommunication systems. Therefore, when a mobile phone is seized at a crime scene and is
switched off, it is imperative that the investigator place it in Faraday bag to avoid the evidence change in case the device
powers on automatically. Faraday bags are made to isolate the mobile phone from the network. Second, when a mobile
phone is recovered from a crime scene and is found to be switched on and locked with a password, PIN, fingerprint, or
facial recognition the examinerwill be required to bypass the lock. This phase links to the acquisition phasewhich involves
the extraction of data from the device. Acquisitionmethod is determined depending on devicemake, model, and installed
operating system. It is crucial that acquisition be done using a tested method which is forensically sound and repeatable.
The examination and analysis process employs the use various software tools to extract data of interest from the
acquired image or files. Significantly, as no single tool can parse all the data from the mobile phone, it is vital that the
examiner have sound knowledge of file systems structures to recover all the data that tools cannot process. According
to Domingues et al,22 this phase is followed by verification process to determine the accuracy of the acquired data by
comparing the extracted data to the data on the mobile phone to identify any possible discrepancies. It also uses a variety
of tools to compare the results to identify any differences using hash values to identify if data on the images has changed
since acquisition. The reporting phase involves documentation of all processes indicating what was done during the
acquisition and examination processes. The research ofAyers et al23 pointed out that the documentation should be in form
of contemporaneous notes. The investigator notes can include details such as the case background, the status of the device
when received, tools used among other notable findings of the case investigation. The findings should be concise, clear,
and repeatable in a manner acceptable in court. Timeline and Link analysis tools are essential in assisting investigators to
establish patterns acrossmultiple devices being investigated. After documentation and reporting the data extracted should
be preserved and archived in a usable format for future references and record keeping as per jurisdiction requirements.
The following contributions are made by this article:
• This article identified both qualitative and quantitative artifacts as potential evidence when Facebook Messenger as
an instant messaging (IM) application is set as a default messaging application and their potential impacts on social
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media. The metadata obtained in the research can be a crucial resource of how social media texts can be collected by
cyber criminals for attacks. This metadata can also be used for sociological and linguistic research.
• Forensically, our research shows that some information such as the phone number and deleted timestamp recoverable
when a user deletes SMS when using messenger as a default Messaging application on Android 6.0.1. Our results
showed flags that can indicate whether an Identified phone number was the one that messenger received SMS from
or one that Messenger sent SMS to. It proved that it is possible to retrieve the timestamps when Messenger Send or
Receives SMS. This flag indicates an SMS sent or received by the messenger has been deleted during digital forensic
investigation.
• We demonstrated how virtualization using Bluestack windows application can be used in conducting Android appli-
cations research by setting Facebook Messenger as the default SMS application. To the best of our knowledge, this
experiment has never been conducted elsewhere before now.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related approaches in the literature on
forensic data extraction and social media privacy issue. Section 3 describes the proposed method for setting Facebook
Messenger as a default messaging applications and extracting the artifacts accordingly. The experimental design and
results were provided in sections 4 and 5, respectively. A comparison with some related work was discussed in section 6
while section 7 was devoted to conclusion and future.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Forensic data extraction from instant messaging applications
Anumber of researchers have carried out significant studies on data extraction frommessaging applications. The research
ofGruschka et al32 performed a data extraction from instantmessaging applications focusing onWhatsApp andFacebook.
While socialmedial and instantmessaging applications are used for good intentions, criminals use it to perpetrate evil.29-31
The amount of information contained by these applications can be used to address digital-related crime cases in the
court of law. In the research of Chu et al25 approach involved investigating Facebook application artifacts in windows
XP computer volatile memory (RAM), browser cache files, virtual machine image, and snapshot files as well as iPhone
and android file system dump. Their investigation on the two mobile devices involved logical acquisition using XRY and
Oxygen forensic tools. Logical acquisition was conducted on Huawei installed with unrooted Android 2.1 and also on
iPhone running iOS 4.3 which was not jail-broken. This research established artifacts such as chat messages, contacts,
and photos from the Facebook application.
The study of Corcoran et al26 conducted further investigation titled Messaging Application Analysis for Android and
iOS platforms. Their investigation involved experimenting with Android smartphone HTC EVO 3D which was rooted
to allow access to the operating system files. Their methodology involved resetting the phone to its factory settings to
remove any previous user applications and then acquiring both physical and logical images of the smartphone when the
applications were not installed. The phone was then installed with seven applications among them Facebook Messenger
and then the image was acquired. The final step involved generating applications data and then acquiring the image
which was analyzed to identify application artifacts. Results from the artifact analysis indicated that they found chat
conversations, locations, and contacts. However, they did not explain the locations from which they recovered these
artifacts. Furthermore, their researchwas based onAndroid 4.0.3 IceCreamSandwich aswell as older version of Facebook
Messenger and did not properly focus on all the artifacts that can be retrieved from the Facebook Messenger. Besides,
their research appears to have been outdated as the current Facebook Messenger version has new settings and features
(Figure A1).
2.2 Social media and data privacy issue
Data privacy in relation to how data is shared with the third party is becoming a big challenge in data protection.32-35
During social media registration, a lot of users’ data is collected ranging from name to date of birth, even location. This
data can be exploited for negative when accessed by cybercriminals. On documenting Facebook privacy data, the study
6 of 21 NTONJA and ASHAWA
of Tahiri27 published investigation involved the installation of Facebook Messenger on rooted Samsung Galaxy J1 phone.
Logical acquisition on Facebook Messenger files was performed using ADB pull command and files were analyzed using
SQLite Browser. The result showed that some of the user’s data were accessed by a third party.
Investing open data challenges at Facebook, the research of Bronson et al36 identified how the application stores huge
volume of artifacts which can be relied upon during investigation. The electronic evidence contains hash codes that link
to data identification.37 Credibility of electronic evidence in relation to data associated with social media applications can
be verified. Evidence that are modified can also be used to extend further forensic investigations.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research question
A number of new features of interest to digital forensics community on Facebook Messenger were implemented in the
year 2016. None of the existing researches on Facebook Messenger has addressed the implications of these new features
to mobile forensic investigations. After considering these features, the following research question was formulated.
“Are there recoverable artifacts generated by setting Facebook Messenger as a default SMS application on Android
6.0.1 Marshmallow running on Samsung S5 device?”
To answer the research question above, the following research objectives were set:
1. Establish changes that could indicate that messenger has been enabled as a default SMS application in Android and
how its records Chat and SMSmessages in its user interface. FacebookMessenger was set as a default SMS application
and changes that occur to its relevant application package files were noted in comparison with the control experiment.
Furthermore, SMS and normal chat conversation were tested to examine how they are recorded in both messenger
app and its relevant databases.
2. Identify artifacts left whenmessenger receives SMSwhen set as a default Messaging application. To achieve this objec-
tive, a clean Messenger application was set to receive SMS from four different mobile network numbers to have much
data to populate the databases. SMS deletion was also considered. The messenger databases of interest were then
compared with the control experiment.
3. Identify SMS artifacts left when a user disables Messenger as a default messaging application. To achieve this objec-
tive, the relevant application databases will be examined to determine if they have any traces of artifacts that can be
recovered once the application is disabled as a default SMS client and the user has logged out. Does disabling erase all
the User activity data if any?
3.2 Resources
This research could be carried out using variety of devices and would involve experimentation with a number of both
high-end and low-end mobile phones which would require a substantial financial implication. Furthermore, the project
would involve establishing how the Facebook Messenger application behaves in all the Android versions. While this is
not possible due to a fixed budget, one or two mobile devices were selected for experimentation and virtualization was
used as an alternative to more devices where needed. A forensic workstation running Windows 10 having memory of
8 GB and core i5 processor was used for extraction and analysis of the experimental data. The workstation had a good
processing capacity to allow running of required tools. Tools and devices used for the experiment are listed in Tables 1
and 2, respectively. These tools are both mobile forensic and non-mobile forensic tools and will be used for extraction
and analysis of the experimental data. The list of tools and experimental devices used in this work are listed in Tables 1
and 2, respectively.
4 EXPERIMENTATION
The workstation was set-up using a Windows 10 Enterprise Compaq Desktop computer with Intel Core i5 processor and
4 GBRAM, respectively. Theworkstationwas installed with up to date versions of the selected tools (Table 1). Preliminary
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TABLE 1 List of used tools
Hardware/Software Version
Android SDK 27.0.1
Windows ADB Adb 1.0.40,
XRY 7.6
DB Browser for SQLite 3.10.1
Odin 3.12.7
SuperSSu by Chainfire 3.13.4




TABLE 2 Devices used for the experiment
Device OS Operator
Samsung S5 Android Not applicable
Nexus 4 Android Not applicable
5 SIM cards Not applicable giffgaff
Samsung USB cable Magnetic Moment Not applicable
Facebook messenger Not applicable Not applicable
experiments were performed to determine the nature of default Android applications using Bluestack before the actual
experimentation was carried out using Android smartphone. In the experimental setup, LG Nexus 4 Android 5.1.1 and
Samsung Galaxy S5 Model SM-G900F running Android version 6.0.1 Marshmallow was the two mobile devices used
for the experiment. The devices were installed with Facebook Messenger application version 181.0.0.12.78 within the
experimentation period from o6 September 2018 and. The experimental setup summarized as shown in Figure 2. LG
Nexus 4 running Android 5.1.1 Lollipop was used for data generation. This device is solely used for data generation and
was not extracted. Samsung Galaxy S5Model SM-G900F running Android version 6.0.1Marshmallowwas extracted after
data generation using ADB and XRY for validation of the results. Four SIM cards were used to generate data in LG Nexus
4 Android 5.1.1 device. The reason for using the four SIM is to have much data to populate the Facebook Messenger
databases.
During the preliminary experiment, the Data_0.vdi image which contained the Android file hierarchy containing
cache, data, local, and misc partitions were extracted. We then performed another preliminary experiment to determine
the nature of Android Facebook Messenger application files in theData.vdi. Examination onData.vdi andData_0.vdi
indicated the images contain EXT4 android file system with an MBR partitioning style containing com.facebook.orca
database with smstakeover_db. The two preliminary experiments have provided an overview of location of Facebook
Messenger files. Facebook Messenger version 181.0.0.12.78 was downloaded from play store and configured as default
SMS App to ensure that the messenger uses same configuration during data generation. To prevent autoupdate of the
Facebook Messenger during data generation and extraction, the auto-update service was disabled throughout the entire
experimentation process. During data extraction process, different command from the power shell was executed to list
the connected devices, to start the connected devices, to switch to root user, and then navigate to data partition which
stores Facebook Messenger application data in a package named com.facebook.orca respectively. The -ls -l command
was then executed to recursively list the content of the data partition. Command ls -l | grep com.facebook.orca was
executed to only view the details of the Facebook Messenger package. The messenger application on Samsung Galaxy S5
was accessed and was used to initiate SMS conversation with LG Nexus 4. Samsung Galaxy s5 was put to flight mode and
restarted to allow messenger application package to be extracted. Messenger data was then extracted using the ADB tool
commands.
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F IGURE 2 Configuring third-party app as a Default SMS App
The SIM card in Samsung S5 was maintained throughout the experiments and it was not changed to ensure consis-
tency of the experimental data. All the SIM cards have unique subscriber number which will be useful in conducting
keyword search during analysis. The Gmail accounts have been set up using one of the researchers’ name mixed with
numberswhich are unique to each email. Thiswas useful during keyword searching of all used emails. The FacebookMes-
senger was thereafter activated by first registering dummy Facebook accounts and then activating messenger accounts
using the registered email on Facebook. The same credentials were used as set up for FacebookMessenger using login by
Facebook option. This option was considered because it gives more user anonymity as opposed to using mobile number
to register the messenger account. In addition, most mobile website Facebook users will need to register on messenger to
send and read messages from their friends. Furthermore, criminals will make dummy Facebook accounts using dummy
emails and use them to login tomessenger hencemaintaining their anonymity status. Three dummyFacebookMessenger
contacts were created to be used as friends and also to be used to login to Messenger application for user data generation
as seen in Table 3.
4.1 Preliminary experiment A
The focus of this experiment was to determine the nature of default android applications using Bluestack Emulator before
actual experimentation using an Android smartphone. Bluestack Emulator was setup on the workstation were the Gmail
account was registered. A Gmail account was particularly registered for this purpose as there was no consideration for
any analysis the Gmail account usedwas given the researcher’s name. Android folder fromEngine directory was exported
to Preliminary Experiment 1 directory on the workstation Desktop for analysis using Winhex. The image was examined
for main Android system partitions. The main Android partitions such as cache, data, local, and misc were present. Data
partition was accessed to identify the default preinstalled applications.
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TABLE 3 Facebook messenger account set-up and SIM cards details
LG
Nexus 4 Samsung S5
Device Information LG Nexus 4 Android 5.1.1
Lollipop




Google play account Email:
ashwa.mos940@gmail.com
Google play account Email:
ashwa.mos940@gmail.com
Messenger Account Login by Facebook option:
Email:
morrisn402@gmail.com
Login by Facebook option:
Email:
morriston940@gmail.com




4.1.1 Preliminary experiment B
During this experiment, Facebook Messenger account was created when there was no user activity generated. Android
folder from Engine directory was exported to Preliminary Experiment 2 directory on the workstation Desktop for analysis
using Winhex. Two Virtual Disk Image (VDI) images; Data.vdi and Data_0.vdi were opened in their respective order
as they were differencing virtual hard disks to read a differencing VMDK/VHD/VDI image. The image was examined for
main Android file system partitions and to identify the change after installation of Facebook Messenger. Data partition
(/data) was accessed to identify the change in android application packages after the installation of Facebook Messenger
account. DB browser for SQLite was used to access data/com.facebook.orca/databases.
The database directorywas observed to contain SQLite databases which are important for this research as they hold all
the applicationuser data. For this research, smstakeover_dbwill beKey as the experimentswill be conducted to establish
if it stores any forensically important artifacts. However, other databases will be analyzed for variety of other experimental
artifacts. The two preliminary experiments have provided an overview of the location of Facebook Messenger files. The
preliminary experiment 2 has formed a foundation for experimentation phase of this research. Secondly, the experiment
has established Facebook Messenger application database files. The experiment has shown that indeed there exists a
database file smstakeover_db that has potential of storing SMS evidence.
4.1.2 Configuration of FacebookMessenger as a default SMS App and data generation
As explained in the experimentation section, Facebook Messenger in both Nexus 4 and Samsung s5 device Facebook
Messenger was configured as default Messaging application. This was to ensure that messenger uses same configura-
tion during data generation. To prevent autoupdate of the Facebook Messenger application during data generation and
extraction, the application autoupdate was disabled throughout the entire experimentation process.
The data was generated on Samsung Galaxy S5 using Nexus 4 phone by enabling device root-
ing. In the forensic workstation, PowerShell was enabled to location of portable adb tool (PS
C:∖platform-tools_r28.0.1-windows∖platform-tools>) by connecting the rooted devices using micro-USB cable to
the workstation. The connected devices were listed by executing the PowerShell command. /adb.exe shell. We then
switched to the root user to enable access to the Facebook Messenger data partition.
To ignore other partitions and concentrate to view only the Facebook Messenger packages, ls -l | grep
com.facebook.orca command was executed. The entire com.facebook.orca package contents to the experi-
ments directory in the workstation was then copied by navigating to the PS C:∖platform-tools_r28.0.1-
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F IGURE 3 Summary of the Experimental setup and flow
windows∖platform-tools> and execute command /.adb.exe pull /storage/0403-0201/com.facebook.orca/ /Desk-
top/Experiments (Figure 3).
4.2 Control experiment
The focus of the control experiment was to generate a clear messenger package contents with empty databases that would
serve as a comparative basis during analysis for other experiments containing user data. During this experiment, the
used devices were reset to factory settings to clear any existing user data. The USB debugging mode was then activated,
and the devices were rooted respectively. Facebook Messenger version 181.0.0.12.78 was installed and accessed using the
registered user credentials as shown in Table 3. At this stage, no user data was generated. The devices were connected
to the forensic workstation using micro-USB cable for extraction using the ADB tool. The rest of the approach for data
generation were same as those in the preliminary experiments (Figure A2).
4.2.1 Data generation
User datawas generated by the use of animal and their babynames in this format (animalname-babyname). The generated
unique words were used in conducting keyword searches during data analysis. Although Samsung S5 Device was used
as set up in Control experiment, additional setting of enabling Messenger as a default messaging app was introduced by
enabling the USB debugging mode. The Samsung Galaxy S5 was rooted and set up with SIM card (0775****734) and SD
card. The Facebook smstakeover_db database was extracted using DB Browser for SQLite (Figure 4).
To determine messages sent from Galaxy S5 to different contacts, the devices were accessed to send SMS Messages to
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F IGURE 4 Structure of
smstakeover_db database
The device was then set to flight mode to isolate it from its environment. After engaging with on SMS conversation
with contacts, Galaxy s5 was disabled as default MP. The messenger application on LG Nexus 4 was accessed and was
used to initiate SMS conversation with Samsung Galaxy S5. XRY was then used to complete the logical extraction. The
results obtained are discussed in the next section.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis on cache folder indicated the following contents of Com.facebook.orca/Cache as extracted using
FTK Imager. Com.facebook.orca/Cache contains com.facebook.orca/cache/notification_log_event0.txt. This
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com.facebook.orca/Cache
text log file contains application messaging events with a message request snippet Fetcher. Examina-
tion on com.facebook.orca/databases indicated two SMS databases of interest to the research. These were
com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db and com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db-journal respectively.
Examination on com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db indicated that the database contained six tables as shown
in Figure 5; while com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db-journal was encrypted and could not be opened
using DB Browser for SQlite.
5.1 FacebookMessenger’ records in the interface
Examination on the messenger home screen indicated the chat messages are recorded under messages tab together
with SMS. The SMS conversation indicated a purple theme icon attached to the profile picture. The purple color of
this icon did not appear to change despite the customization of SMS colors by the user. On the other hand, nor-
mal chat messages indicated white color theme and the colors cannot be customized by the user. Due to the prior
literature knowledge that com.facebook.orca/databses/threads_db stores chat messages; it was important to exam-
ine this database to identify if it has any evidence of SMS conversation. Analysis of this database indicated that
the messages table was populated with only chat messages with timestamps stored in Unixepoch format as shown
in Figure 6; storing SMS messages recorded in this database. Both SMS and messenger normal chat conversations
are recorded under messages tab. The SMS conversations are identified by a purple theme small icon attached to
the main profile picture. The purple color of this icon did not appear to change despite the customization of SMS
colors by the researcher. Normal chat message conversations do not have the purple theme small icon attached
to the main profile picture. Therefore, using this difference, investigators can easily tell when messenger has been
used for SMS messaging. However, this is possible only when the user has not deleted the SMS messages in the
.orca database.
Analysis of data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db and data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/
threads_db indicates that only smstakeover_db stores SMS messaging information when using messenger appli-
cation. Examination and comparison were only done on the data/data/com.facebook.orca/ cache folder and
there were no search queries conducted on the identified threads_db and smstakeover_db databases since their
comparison was adequate answer to the intended research objective. This research set precedence for inves-
tigation of Facebook Messenger application when set as a default SMS application in Smartphones running
Android operating system. While the objective of this research was adequately achieved, there are some areas
of this thesis as well as other potential related areas that would require further investigation. Further research
can be carried on examining com.facebook.orca/app_gatekeepers, the smstakeover_db Database rollback journal
(smstakeover_db-journal).
5.2 Messenger set as a default messaging application
During the examination of the databases, it was noted that the smstakeover_db was populated with some data from
the received SMS. For the experiments, the messenger smstakeover_db was analyzed then compared with the control
experiment and the preceding experiments to identify any evidentiary trails left when it is used to receive SMS. Since
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F IGURE 6 Messages stored as text in /data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/threads_db
F IGURE 7 Smstakeover_db database address_table columns using DB Browser for AQLite
the address_table was populated with data it was important to examine its columns and the nature of the data stored
(Figure 7).
The scores_ts column the timestamps are stored in 13 characters non-human readable “unixepoch” format. While
comparison of the smstakeover_db databases was enough to determine the artifacts left when messenger receives SMS it
was also necessary to see if the scores_ts column unixepoch timestamps could indicate those of receiving time as noted
during experimentation and subsequently determine if scores_ts column indicate time when the SMS was received.
Therefore, conversion to human readable formatwas essential. For conversion the SQLite datetime functionwas used. The
SQL command Select address, scores_ts, datetime (scores_ts/1000, “unixepoch”)was run on a copy of the database;
from address_table, the result of running this command can be seen in Figure 8.
Alternatively, SQL update function can be used to update the scores_ts to a human-readable format using datetime
function by executing the commandUpdate address_table set scores_ts= datetime(scores_ts/1000, “unixepoch”).
Executing this command resulted in a change in the database since the column scores_ts was updated to human-readable
format permanently and therefore was performed on a copy of the database. Both of these commands work by dividing
the date by 1000 to give seconds since the 13 characters record the date in Milliseconds and then updating the scores_ts
to human-readable format (Figure 9).
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F IGURE 8 Converting
and updating the address table
scores_ts column timestamps
F IGURE 9 The delete_score_ts and scores_ts are stored in UNIX epoch format
5.3 Artifacts left when messenger sends SMS as a default messaging application
The result shows that it is possible to identify some artifacts related to SMS messages sent when messenger appli-
cation is set as a default SMS application in android. These artifacts include; the phone number which sent the
SMS, the date the SMS was sent as well as the date and time when the SMS was deleted by the user from
the Messenger application. The changes observed when the SMS was deleted are recorded. It was observed that
once the user deletes a sent SMS message the phone number and the deleted time stamp still remained in the
data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db database in the address_table table andwas recoverable. This is
significant strength for examiners since the phone number was still recoverable despite the message having been deleted
as seen in Figure 10.
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F IGURE 10 Scores_ts and delete_scores_ts from the addres_tables
F IGURE 11 Smstakeover_db_address_table after disabling messenger as a default messaging application
The scores_ts column in the address_table of data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db database how-
ever appeared to only give the correct date on when the SMS messages were sent. It also seemed to indicate the time as
when the first SMSwas sent and this timewas incorrectly placed to other SMSmessages sent. This implied that this times-
tamp was not correct and therefore should not be relied upon by the investigators. On the other hand, the delete_score_ts
column timestamp conversion results shown the exact time when the sent message was deleted by the user as recorded
during experimentation and therefore provided a reliable timestamp for the examiner. For the deleted sent SMSmessages,
the value on ranking_score column in smstakeover_db was observed to be random decimal number each starting with
value 2.99. This could be used as a flag to indicate SMS sent from the messenger. However, as limitation to the research,
this finding could not be validated as it would require repeated experiments to confirm this finding. While this can be
appreciated as a positive finding of these experiments, it was discovered that it is not possible to recover these artifacts
from the live smstakeover_db database once the user uninstalls the Messenger application.
5.4 Artifacts left when a user disables messenger as a default messaging application
Amajor strength of the collated results of the experiments under this objective is that they showed that the user SMS data
is not usually cleared when messenger is disabled as a default messaging application as seen in Figure 11.
This finding is significant as it can help investigators recover SMSdata frommessengerwhen the user has used and dis-
abled the application as default messaging application. Analysis of smstakeover_db indicated that it contained some data
regarding the SMS conversation. It was also noted that for the SMS conversations between two numbers the value on rank-
ing_score column in smstakeover_db database (address_table) was a random decimal number each starting with value
7.99. This could be suggested as a flag for identifying contacts that have engaged in SMS conversation using messenger
application.
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6 COMPARISON WITH SOME RELATED WORK
Facebook artifacts generation methodology proposed in Reference 24 was based on keyword search image to identity
Facebook Messenger artifacts while their investigation seems outdated as at now, their research was only based on Face-
book chat in computer and ignored mobile devices which are now most likely to be used in accessing chat applications.
Virtualization approach in Reference 25 established artifacts such as chat messages, contacts and photos from the Face-
book application through jail breaking. As proposed in Reference 26 obtained results from the artifacts analysis indicated
that they found chat conversations, locations, and contacts.
However, they did not explain the locations from which they recovered these artifacts. Furthermore, their research
was based on Android 4.0.3 Ice Cream Sandwich as well as older version of Facebook Messenger and did not properly
focus on all the artifacts that can be retrieved from the Facebook Messenger. Besides, their research appears to have been
out-dated as the current Facebook Messenger version has new settings and features. Using rooted approach as proposed
in Reference 27 identified the location of FacebookMessenger artifacts in Android. Ourwork, however, focused on setting
Facebook Messenger as a default SMS messaging application.
As noted in section one, SMS feature was announced as an optional setting that would allow Facebook Messenger
users to send, receive and read their SMS and MMS from their Messenger application without having to switch to the
default SMS Messages application in their Android mobile phones. As the author pointed, the objective of introducing
SMS feature was to shift awaymessenger users from their default mobile phoneMessages application and see them spend
more time in the Messenger application. Derek Walter in Reference 28 claimed that the Messenger application does not
save or store any of the SMS in its servers. Indeed, from the experimentation results, it has been shown that it is true that
Messenger does not store any SMS in its servers.
However, from the experimentation results, it is clear that Messenger does store some of the SMS artifacts which
include the phone number which SMS was sent to or was received from as well as the accompanying time stamps when
Facebook Messenger has been enabled as a default messages application in Android 6.0.1. Noteworthy, these artifacts
appeared to be wiped out once the user uninstalls and then reinstalls or otherwise logs out the application by clearing
data and cache. This finding is important for the digital forensic community and particularly mobile forensics field since
it has shown that Facebook Messenger is capable of storing some SMS artifacts and therefore should not be overlooked
especially in cases when there are no recoverable SMS artifacts during mobile device examination and the device user
had Facebook Messenger application installed and being active.
Due to the prior literature knowledge that com.facebook.orca/databses/threads_db stores messenger chat
messages it was important to examine this database to identify if it has any evidence of SMS conversation.
Analysis of this database indicated that the messages table was populated with only chat messages with times-
tamps stored in Unixepoch format as shown in Figure 6. Although both SMS and messenger normal chat con-
versations are recorded under messages tab, The SMS conversations are identified by a purple theme small
icon attached to the main profile picture. The purple color of this icon did not appear to change despite
the customization of SMS colors by the researcher. Therefore, using this difference, investigators can easily tell
when messenger has been used for SMS messaging. However, this is possible only when the user has not
deleted the SMS messages. Result on analysis of data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/smstakeover_db and
data/data/com.facebook.orca/databases/threads_db indicated that only smstakeover_db stores SMS messaging
information when using messenger application. The smstakeover_db address_table constituted most of the recoverable
artifacts including the phone number, the SMS deletion timestamp, and other unique data that could distinguish SMS
conversations using the messenger application.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Android is the most popular smartphone operating system used by many people across the world. Besides, android can
be described as an open ecosystem allowing its users to customize some of its default features and settings. One android
setting that can be easily customized by user is the default SMS application. Messages app is by default set as Android
messaging app allowing users to send and receive SMS as well as MMS. However, Messages app can be changed to other
messaging applications such as Facebook Messenger, Textra, GoSMS, hangouts, Signal among variety of other instant
messaging applications that can be downloaded from Google play store by Android smartphone user. It is crucial that
mobile forensic investigators pay attention to the kind of SMSartifacts that these android applications can store. Therefore,
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it is important that themany instantmessaging applicationswhich can be set as defaultmessaging applications inAndroid
be investigated to identify the nature of SMS artifacts they store. This is because they could store crucial artifacts that
may not be recoverable through Android device exploitation using existing mobile forensic tools and therefore could
provide essential information during cases. This research has provided a foundation for research on instant messaging
applications that can be set as default SMS application on Android devices. Facebook Messenger is one of the popular
android instant messaging applications with over 1.3 billion monthly active users globally.
By devising a research question; are there recoverable forensic artifacts generated by setting Facebook Messenger
as a default SMS application on Android 6.0.1 Marshmallow running on Samsung Galaxy S5 device? This thesis has
investigated the artifacts generated by setting Facebook Messenger as default messaging application in Android 6.0.1
Marshmallow. As it has been demonstrated by the research XRY tool could not parse FacebookMessenger data in android
6.0.1 running on Samsung Galaxy S5 device. This, therefore, calls for the use of alternative tools. The research has shown
that it is possible to recover some artifacts fromMessenger when set as a default messaging application in Android. These
artifacts included; the phone number either sending or receiving SMS, the sent, or received timestamp. The research has
also shown that some unique flags can be used to tell if messenger application was used to either send or receive SMS
message. Finally, the research has shown that when a messenger application is uninstalled or logged out by clearing
user data and cache then the SMS information is wiped from the application. The study demonstrated that Facebook
Messenger does not store actual SMSmessage content but stores the phone number which it sends or receives SMS from.
By implication, the privacy of users is at stake. In countries where SIM cards are registered, users’ biodata are attached
to the phone number of the user. Thus, if the phone number can be stored by Facebook Messenger, this will facilitate
pointing out where other personal information of the user can be accessed during digital forensic investigation.
Further research can be carried out focusing primarily on multimodality which could increase alternatives for con-
solidating visual materials such as emoji and photographs in the Facebook Messenger application when sett as a default
messaging application.
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